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Abstract
In this paper we highlight a new complementary channel to the business and social
network effect a` la Rauch (2001) through which immigrants generate increased export
flows from the regions in which they settle to their countries of origin: they can become en-
trepreneurs. Using very small-scale (NUTS-3) administrative data on immigrants’ location
in Italy, the local presence of immigrant entrepreneurs (i.e. firms owned by foreign-born
entrepreneurs) in the manufacturing sector, and on trade flows in manufacturing between
Italian provinces and more than 200 foreign countries, we assess the causal relationship
going from diasporas and immigrant entrepreneurs towards export flows. Both the size
of the diaspora and the number of immigrant entrepreneurs have a positive, significant
and economically meaningful effect on exports. We find that increasing the stock of (non-
entrepreneur) immigrants by 10% would lead to a 1.7% increase in exports in manufac-
turing towards immigrants’ countries of origin, while increasing the number of immigrant
entrepreneurs in manufacturing by 10% would raise exports by about 0.6%. We also show
that, besides these bilateral effects, the population of immigrant entrepreneurs raises a
province’s overall competitiveness and export flows towards all potential destinations.
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1 Introduction
The prevailing explanation for the positive effect of immigrants on exports is
that proposed by Rauch (1999, 2001) and Rauch and Trindade (2002), and
it is consistent with the significant empirical evidence from several national
cases (Combes et al., 2005, Peri and Requena-Silvente, 2010, Bratti et al.,
2014): this is the so-called business and social network effect. Briefly, when
immigrants move from their home country to a new country of residence,
they affect not only the latter’s labour supply and local demand for goods
and services, but also bring to the host country knowledge of their home
country’s economy and institutions and kinship links that endure in spite of
distance and time. This knowledge and these links can be exploited by the
host (home) country’s entrepreneurs, who can use them to reduce the sunk
cost of exporting to and importing from the migrants’ country of origin (e.g.
information costs1) and/or to plane away the marginal cost of exporting.2
Since the knowledge and the international links embodied in immigrants
are largely country specific, the reduction in trade costs acts mainly at the
bilateral level.
Although most literature has focused on co-ethnic population networks
(namely the effect of immigrants), the individuals who are the natural can-
didates to explain business and social network effects are those who have
business-related knowledge and business contacts abroad and who are able
to profit from that, having settled down in the host country as migrants: the
group of immigrants that establishes firms in the host country and that we
call for simplicity immigrant entrepreneurs.3 On top of promoting trade by
providing market information, by supplying matching and referral services,
and by ensuring contract enforcement through social sanctions when market
institutions are weak — like non-entrepreneur migrants can do — immigrant
entrepreneurs are also able to directly exploit the advantages deriving from
knowledge of their own country, which is better than that of domestic en-
1 Cross-border networks of people sharing the same country of origin can substitute
or integrate organized markets in matching international demand and supply. See Rauch
(1999) and Felbermayr et al. (2015) for a summary of the literature.
2 As stated by Briant et al. (2014): “. . . immigrant networks may provide contract
enforcement through sanctions and exclusions, which substitutes for weak institutional
rules and reduces trade costs.”
3 In what follows, we use the term ‘immigrant entrepreneurs’ to refer to firms owned by
immigrants, and not necessarily to those producing and selling ‘ethnic goods,’ i.e. goods
with specific cultural or national connotations.
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trepreneurs, to directly sell their goods abroad.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that, controlling for
standard gravity equation covariates and the role played by diasporas, rigor-
ously quantifies the causal effect of immigrant entrepreneurs on international
trade.4 This is a timely moment to increase the stock of knowledge on this
issue. As stated by Naud et al. (2017), in spite of “entrepreneurship and mi-
gration [being] at the very top of many national and international agendas,”
little is still known on the interplay between these two phenomena.
Of course, the increasing relevance of immigrant entrepreneurship goes
hand in hand with the increase in migration flows,5 and the rate of self-
employment of immigrants tends to be higher than that of natives or, at any
rate, substantial6 and growing.7 But precise quantification of the causal effect
of immigrant entrepreneurs on exports is uncommon, and we contribute to
build up an initial stock of knowledge on this important issue.
Using administrative data on immigrants’ location in Italian provinces,8
i.e. diasporas (see, Beine et al., 2011), on the number of immigrant en-
trepreneurs by nationality in the manufacturing sector, and on export flows
in the same sector between Italian provinces and more than 200 foreign coun-
tries, we assess, though an instrumental variables (IV) strategy, the causal
4 Unlike Aleksynska and Peri (2014), we do not use data on immigrants employed in
business-related occupations (e.g managers, sales persons), who may also work in non-
tradeable sectors, but we use administrative data on the stock of manufacturing firms
owned by immigrants. Our paper also adds to the cross-sectional evidence in Aleksynska
and Peri (2014) by providing panel-data evidence for very small geographical units.
5 Olney (2013) looking at establishments in US cities, shows the positive correlation
between immigrants and the number of establishments, especially those of a smaller size.
6 Internationally, as reported by the OECD (2010), “immigrants in many OECD coun-
tries exhibit higher rates of self-employment than natives,” notably in Canada, France,
the UK, Australia, the Nordic countries and the eastern European countries. Even where
immigrants exhibit lower rates of self-employment than natives, as in Turkey, Spain, Por-
tugal, Greece, Switzerland and Italy, those rates are above 10%. In Italy the rate is
17.5%.
7 In dynamic terms, Fairlie and Lofstrom (2014) observe that “. . . trends in self-
employment rates and new business formation are increasing among immigrants but de-
creasing among natives.” From this point of view Italy is no exception. The overall number
of foreign-owned individual (i.e. single owner) firms increased substantially over the past
decade, at an annualized rate of 4.4%, countervailing the decrease in domestically owned
individual enterprises, -4.5% per year, with annual changes computed as compound annual
growth rates.
8 In the Classification of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS; Nomenclature des units
territoriales statistiques), provinces correspond to NUTS-3 level regions.
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relationship going from diasporas and immigrant entrepreneurs towards ex-
port flows. The endogeneity of the diaspora and immigrant entrepreneurs
is addressed by using both the popular instrument based on immigrant en-
claves (Altonji and Card, 1991) and instruments built using auxiliary gravity
models. Both variables, the diaspora and that of immigrant entrepreneurs,
have a positive, significant and economically meaningful effect on exports. In
particular, we find that increasing the number of immigrants in a province by
10% (i.e. about 26 immigrants at the sample mean) would lead to a 1.7% in-
crease in exports towards their country of origin, while increasing immigrant
entrepreneurship by 10% (i.e. a bit less than one entrepreneur, precisely 0.84
at the sample mean) would raise exports by about 0.6%.
Besides these bilateral trade-creating effects, our analysis demonstrates
that the number of immigrant entrepreneurs impacts positively on province-
level exports by increasing a province’s overall competitiveness, which raises
its exports towards all potential destinations. We find that increasing the
population of immigrant entrepreneurs by 10% increases competitiveness (i.e.
the province-year fixed effect of the gravity model) by 2.4%.
Our paper contributes to the literature on the role of social and business
network effects on international trade by capturing the effect of immigrant
entrepreneurs over and above that of diasporas. Moreover, it is also related
to the recent literature on the impact of immigrants on economic growth
and development (see, for instance, Ortega and Peri, 2014), highlighting the
effect of immigrant entrepreneurs on exports.
The structure of the paper is as follows. The next section sets the stage
for the analysis, reviewing some related literature. Section 3 describes the
theoretical setup, which links diasporas and immigrant entrepreneurs to ex-
ports. Section 4 describes the main features of the data we use. Section
5 describes the empirical strategy that we follow to investigate the effect of
diasporas and immigrant entrepreneurs on trade, and Section 6 comments on
the main findings. Finally, Section 7 concludes, summarizing the novelties of
the paper and pointing out possible directions for future research.
2 Related literature
As pointed out in the introduction, a wealth of studies on the association
between immigrants and trade already exists (see Parsons and Winters, 2014,
Felbermayr et al., 2015, for a review of the evidence). Some recent papers
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try to rigorously assess the causal effect of immigrants on trade by using IV
estimation based either on the shift-share instrument popularized by Altonji
and Card (1991) and motivated by the concept of immigrant enclaves,9 or
by exploiting quasi-experiments provided by refugee dispersion policies (e.g.
Parsons and Ve´zina, 2014, Steingress, 2017).
In spite of this abundance of evidence, the channel through which im-
migrants affect trade remains largely a black box. Drawing on the idea
pioneered by Gould (1994) and further developed by Rauch (2001), namely
the business and social network effect, most authors focus on the bilateral
effect of the foreign-born population of a given nationality located in a region
(i.e. diaspora) on that region’s trade with the immigrants’ country of ori-
gin, and they interpret the positive effect as originating from the knowledge
capital (concerning the country of origin’s market) and the social network of
immigrants. However, none of the extant studies is able to provide smoking-
gun evidence that this is really the explanation, or to explore whether and
how immigrants’ knowledge is transferred to natives, in particular native en-
trepreneurs, for whom this knowledge flow should be relevant primarily to
spurring trade.
Recent studies have sought to add more pieces to this puzzle. The trade-
creating effect of immigrants may depend on their characteristics. One study
reports that immigrants in skilled occupations have a larger effect on trade
(Herander and Saavedra, 2005). Some immigrants could play a pivotal
role in establishing business connections, e.g. those employed in manage-
rial and sales jobs. Consistent with this idea, Aleksynska and Peri (2014)
show that ‘business-related immigrants’ have an effect that is double that
of non-business-related immigrants. Moreover, after classifying immigrants
in managerial and sales jobs by educational level, a statistically significant
positive effect of highly educated immigrants on both imports and exports
is found. Also in line with the social network effect is evidence that inde-
pendent immigrants, who presumably retain stronger family ties with their
home countries, have a larger impact on trade than family immigrants (Head
and Ries, 1998) and the finding that older immigrants, who generally have
more connections, have a stronger effect on trade (Herander and Saavedra,
2005).
Another strand of literature, based on firm-level evidence, highlights the
trade-enhancing role of immigrants inside the firm. Hatzigeorgiou and Lode-
9 For instance, Peri and Requena-Silvente (2010), Bratti et al. (2014).
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falk (2016), in an employer-employee panel for Sweden, show that small firms
in particular can gain from hiring foreign-born workers who are skilled and
recently arrived immigrants and who have a clear positive impact on exports.
Similar evidence is found for Denmark (Hiller, 2013) and France (Marchal
and Nedoncelle, 2016, Mitaritonna et al., 2017), especially for skilled workers.
A separate and growing literature on immigrant entrepreneurs focuses
on the differences between foreign-born and native entrepreneurs and among
foreign-born entrepreneurs.10 Sahin et al. (2014) reports that skilled immi-
grants in the US are “more likely to start firms with more than 10 employees
than comparable natives;” in the UK, the probability of starting a firm is
higher for those who initially arrived on a study visa or a work visa, com-
pared with those who arrived via family reunification (Clark and Drinkwater,
2000). Immigrant entrepreneurs appear to specialize in a narrower range of
industries or occupations than native entrepreneurs (Patel and Vella, 2013).
However, surprisingly enough, none of the existing studies have inves-
tigated the hypothesis that a great deal of the trade-creating effect of im-
migrants may be accounted for, over and above diasporas, by immigrant
entrepreneurs.
3 Conceptual framework
The idea, however, is very simple and intuitive. If diasporas bring knowledge
capital and social networks to the host country, reducing both the sunk and
the marginal cost of exporting, immigrant entrepreneurs are in the position
of directly exploiting this knowledge capital and these links for their own
businesses. Let us frame this idea in a general heterogeneous firms’ set-up of
international trade (Melitz, 2003, Arkolakis et al., 2012), as summarized in
Hsieh et al. (2016).
We focus on country ι. The country is composed of I provinces (with
i ∈ [1, I]). Firms located in each province are (potential) exporters to each
j foreign country (with j ∈ [1,J ]), while immigrants from (potentially) each
j foreign country can settle in (potentially) every province i of country I.
At the aggregate level, and for every unit of time considered, we can express
total exports from province i to country j as Xijt ≥ 0; the total number of
firms located in i and exporting to j as nijt ≥ 0; and the total number of
10 See Fairlie and Lofstrom (2014) for a comprehensive review of the literature and Kerr
and Kerr (2017) for recent evidence from the US.
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immigrants from country j living in province i as Djit ≥ 0. Therefore, both
Djit and Xijt can be zero if there is no diaspora from country j to province
i and if there are no firms located in i that export to country j.
The trade equation relates Xijt to nijt, to the total consumer expenditure
in country j, Yjt, and to the relative price of the average productivity i-firm
selling variety ω to consumers in country j:
Xijt = nijt
(
p¯ijt
Pjt
)1−σ
Yjt, (1)
where Pjt is the price index dual to the CES utility function of consumers in
country j, over the Ωijt varieties produced in i and sold in j, and σ > 1 is
the constant elasticity of substitution between varieties, so that the income
elasticity of demand is also constant.
The price p¯ijt depends on production costs (wit), trade costs (τijt) and
exporting firms’ average productivity (φ¯ijt). A constant mark up is assumed,
for instance,
p¯ijt =
σ
σ − 1
(
witτijt
φ¯ijt
)
=
σ
σ − 1
(
witτijt
kijtφ¯it
)
, (2)
where φ¯ijt is an average computed over the set of all productivities of firms
in province i serving country j (Φijt). We define a variable kijt = φ¯ijt/φ¯it,
i.e. the ratio between the average productivity of firms in i serving market j
and the average productivity computed over all exporters in province i.
Finally, to close the model we equate expenditure with labour income in
country j
Yjt = wjtLjt. (3)
The system of equations (1)-(3) constitutes the conceptual framework
that we use to discuss the possible effects of immigrants on exports. Let us
focus on each equation in turn.
Equation (3) highlights the first mechanical effect of migration on trade:
the contraction in Ljt due to emigration reduces foreign demand. Essentially,
the migration balance in country j will have a positive effect on Xijt. On
the other hand, the interplay between labour demand and labour supply
may lead to positive effects of emigration on labour incomes in the home
country (Dustmann et al., 2015). Yjt can also be influenced by demographic
factors other than migration, by labour market conditions in country j and by
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many social and political factors that go beyond the scope of our conceptual
framework. We cannot account for the effect of these factors on Xijt, but
this calls for the need to take these unspecified factors under control. We
will undertake this by exploiting the panel dimension of the data and using
country j-year fixed effects in the empirical analysis.
Equation (2) indicates the role of prices (p¯ijt) in determining export flows
(Xijt). This will depend in turn on wages (wit), trade costs (τijt) and average
exporting firms’ productivity (φ¯ijt).
As far as wit is concerned, the literature on the wage effect of immigration
is large (Borjas, 1994, 2015, Card, 2001, 2009) and provides different predic-
tions (Ottaviano and Peri, 2012, Bratsberg et al., 2014) depending on labour
market and worker characteristics, on whether markets are fully integrated
or dual/segmented, and on the degree of substitutability or complementar-
ity between domestic workers and immigrant workers. In general, we expect
either a negative or a zero effect on average wages (including both natives
and immigrants) at the province level, with an effect on exports that may be
either positive or null (Cortes, 2008, Balkan and Tumen, 2016). We expect
such effect, if any, to act on Xijt but also on Xit, boosting provincial exports
towards all destinations. The limited information we have on local labour
markets at the province level again raises the need to control for the wage
effect through the use of province i-year fixed effects in the empirical analysis.
As regards φ¯ijt, Ottaviano and Peri (2006) and Sparber (2008) show how
the productivity of firms may be affected by the presence of immigrants.
The channels can be many. If complementarity between workers of different
ethnic groups exists, an increase in ethnic diversity may have a positive ef-
fect on average firms’ productivity.11 Immigrant workers may also be more
productive if they are likely to be positively selected in terms of ability,
especially if they become entrepreneurs. Immigrants might also be more
motivated (Sahin et al., 2014) and work longer or non-standard hours than
natives (Zhang and Sanders, 1999, Giuntella, 2012), and increase production
per worker. High-skilled immigrants also have a positive influence on in-
novation (Lachenmaier and Woessmann, 2006, Hunt and Gauthier-Loiselle,
2010, Parrotta et al., 2014, Jahn and Steinhardt, 2016), which in turn has
a positive impact on trade (Lachenmaier and Woessmann, 2006, Becker and
Egger, 2013). It is, however, difficult to conceive that the positive effect of
11 Although Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) document that the effect can be the opposite
if the integration of different ethnic groups implies extra communication costs for firms.
8
employing immigrants from country j would operate for the specific trading
pair i-j, and we expect diasporas to increase firms’ productivity and create a
positive effect on exports to all destinations. In such a case, the effect of φ¯it
would be well captured by the province i-year fixed effects mentioned pre-
viously. The effect could be different for each destination country if, in the
spirit of Melitz (2003), the increase in productivity affects the destination-
specific productivity thresholds. In that case, the increase in productivity
would be enough to export to certain countries but not to others. This will
emerge both through prices, affecting the intensive margin of firm trade, and
also through the effect on nijt, i.e. the number of exporting firms, which we
will discuss shortly.
The effect of immigrants on trade costs is at the heart of the literature
on migration and trade reviewed in Section 2. Trade costs can be fixed
and sunk, Tijt, or proportional to the value of the good exported, as in the
case of τijt. Diasporas can reduce the marginal costs of exporting from i
to j through the establishment of an enforcement channel, which operates
as an insurance mechanism (Rauch, 2001, Briant et al., 2014). Using the
iceberg cost metaphor, since less of the shipped good melts away during the
journey between i and j, the reduction in τijt due to diasporas operates at
the intensive margin of exports.
Tijt would also be affected by diasporas if the sunk cost of exporting is
related to the knowledge of the market of country j that is embedded in
immigrants from country j located in i. This channel of export promotion
operates at the extensive margin, lowering the productivity threshold of ex-
porting to country j and allowing more firms to become active in such a
market. This would result in an increase in nijt in equation (1).
The level of nijt in equation (1) can also influenced by the number of immi-
grants that become entrepreneurs. The number of immigrant entrepreneurs
active in province i makes nij grow if immigrant entrepreneurs directly use
their country-specific knowledge or their personal links to export. This would
result in an increase in Xijt.
The population of immigrant entrepreneurs and diasporas are, however,
positively correlated,12 and it becomes crucial to isolate the effects of the
12 Immigrant entrepreneurs may be more likely to hire foreign workers at every occupa-
tional level. The presence of immigrant entrepreneurs could, for instance, be the reason
why in a region or in a firm one can find more (highly educated) immigrants working as
sales persons or managers, especially when (skilled) foreign-born workers are discriminated
against by native employers.
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former and the latter to gain a better understanding of what really drives
the immigrants-trade link.13
The above conceptual framework is used to derive the following export
equation, obtained by replacing in equation (1) the price equation (2) and
taking logarithms,
lnXijt = (1− σ) ln( σ
σ − 1) + lnnijt + (1− σ) ln τijt − (1− σ) ln kijt+
+ (1− σ) lnwit − (1− σ)φ¯it︸ ︷︷ ︸
province-year fixed effects
+ (σ − 1) lnPjt + lnYjt︸ ︷︷ ︸
country-year fixed effects
. (4)
We do not observe nijt, τijt and kijt, but for the reasons outlined above
they can be affected by the diaspora and the stock of immigrant entrepreneurs.
Thus we estimate the following reduced form gravity equation,14 which is the
stochastic version of equation (4):
lnXijt = δit+θjt + α1 ln(1 +Dijt) + α2 ln(1 + IEijt)+
+ α3 ln dij + α4Borderij + ijt (5)
where, to recap, i is the subscript for Italian provinces (NUTS-3), j indicates
the foreign country (i.e. the country of origin of immigrants), and t stands
for time. Xijt is trade (exports) between province i and country j at time
t (excluding zero-trade observations). Dijt and IEijt are the stocks of (non-
entrepreneur) immigrants and immigrant entrepreneurs, respectively, from
country j located in province i, potentially acting as a trade-enhancing force,
in contrast to ln(dij), which is the logarithm of the great-circle distance
between province i and country j. Borderi,j is a border dummy, which is
included to take into account possible non-linearities in the effect of distance.
13 This is also relevant for policymaking. If a genuine positive effect on exports is found
for the population of immigrant entrepreneurs, policies aiming to simplify the adminis-
trative burden (e.g. creating offices to help immigrants, who often do not speak the host
country’s language, with administrative requirements) and to reduce the costs required to
set up firms may have positive returns in terms of propelling international trade.
14 The Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) specification of the gravity equation can be
derived from micro-foundations, and it results from an expenditure function that takes into
account the fundamental role of general equilibrium effects in trade, i.e. the multilateral
resistance index. See De Benedictis and Taglioni (2011), Anderson (2011) and Head and
Mayer (2015) on the theoretical foundation of the gravity equation, and Beine et al. (2016)
for an application to migration.
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The province-year fixed effects δits capture the effect of the average level
of wages and firm productivity (i.e. wit and φ¯it, respectively) and can be
considered as indexes of the competitiveness of province i in year t. They
also absorb the effect of factors varying along the same dimensions (e.g.,
the number of native firms, province i’s GDP). The country of origin-year
fixed effects θjts absorb the effect of variables such as country j’s GDP, or
participation in trade agreements. Finally, ijt is an error term clustered at
the province-country level to account for serial correlation in trade.
In the following section, we describe the main features of the data used
in the empirical analysis, including the definition of immigrants and immi-
grant entrepreneurs, while identification and estimation issues are discussed
in Section 5.
4 Data and descriptive statistics
The empirical analysis in this paper is carried out by combining three publicly
available datasets on province-level export flows in manufacturing, foreign-
born residents without Italian citizenship15 and foreign-born entrepreneurs in
manufacturing for the period 2002-2011, respectively.16 Export flows report
the value, originally recorded in euros, of custom transactions between Italian
provinces and around 210 destination countries, while data on foreign-born
residents without Italian citizenship cover 187 nationalities.
Concerning foreign-born entrepreneurs, we use data produced by the
National Chamber of Commerce (Infocamere). The responsibilities of the
Chamber of Commerce are defined by Law n. 580 of 1993.17 The most
relevant duty of Infocamere for our analysis is that provincial offices are in
charge of producing and maintaining the registry of all firms active in Italy.
We focus on individually owned firms (impresa individuale, individual firms
or individual enterprises hereafter), a form of business whose entire legal
and financial representation is vested in a single individual.18 For individual
firms, we can associate firm ownership with a unique person and national-
15 Data are collected by the Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT).
16 The period 2002-2011 is one in which the spatial classification of administrative units
remained invariant in Italian national statistics.
17 Further reformed on February 2010 by Law Decree DL23.
18 Individual entrepreneurs are different from self-employed workers, who do not have
employees.
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ity, and such data can be used to analyze bilateral trade flows using gravity
models.
Individual firms are the most common legal form of firms in Italy. Ac-
cording to Infocamere, at the end of 2013 around 54% of all active firms in
Italy were individual firms. The overall number of foreign-owned firms has
increased substantially over the past decade — at an annualized rate of 4.4%
— and accounted for 10.9% of overall individual firms in 2011 (see Figure 1).
Taking a closer look at the evolution of the time series, it emerges that the
greatest contribution to the sharp rise in foreign entrepreneurs comes from
eastern European countries and from countries outside the EU. The number
of individual firms whose owners were EU residents in 2002 declined at an
annual rate of -2.45%, whereas for extra-EU countries it increased at an an-
nualized rate of 6.04% over the same period (2002-2011). At the geographical
level, the distribution of individual firms is extremely highly correlated with
the overall distribution of firms — see Figure 2.
Table 1 reports the evolution of the foreign presence as both residents
and individual entrepreneurs for the 20 most represented nationalities’ in
2011 (i.e. the final year of our analysis). Concerning the distribution of
countries of origin, immigrant entrepreneurs are significantly more concen-
trated than diasporas. Entrepreneurs from China alone account for 47% of
the total number of individual firms in manufacturing, followed by Romania
and Switzerland.19 As expected, the evolution of foreign residents and immi-
grant entrepreneurs time series is strongly if not perfectly correlated — the
Pearson (unconditional) correlation is 76%. Finally, Table 2 reports descrip-
tive statistics of the estimation sample for our main variables of interest. For
the average province, the number of foreign residents is about 260, whereas
there are fewer than nine foreign individual entrepreneurs.
5 Identification of the effects of diasporas and
immigrant entrepreneurs on exports
A well-known problem in the trade-migration literature is that unobservable
variables affecting immigrants’ location choices may be correlated with those
influencing trade, determining an endogeneity bias. The common solution
19 All the main results reported in the next section are robust if China is excluded from
the estimation sample.
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Figure 1: Immigrant entrepreneurs (proportion of total individual firms)
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Note. The figure plots the proportion of immigrant entrepreneurs on the total number of
individual firms in the manufacturing sector.
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Figure 2: Individual firms per 1000 inhabitants
[6.31, 10.22]
[5.73, 6.30]
[5.13, 5.63]
[4.60, 5.12]
[3.39, 4.57]
 
For 1,000 Natives; mean values 2002-2011
Natives Firms
[15.27, 98.23]
[9.62, 15.13]
[7.11, 9.58]
[5.66, 6.96]
[2.99, 5.54]
 
For 1,000 Immigrants; mean values 2002-2011
Immigrants Firms
Note. The figure plots the incidence of individual firms against the total number of
inhabitants, natives (left panel), or immigrants (right panel) by province. Immigrant
and native firm distributions correlate positively at the province-by-country level. The log
of foreign-owned individual firms is regressed on the log of native firms given a significant
coefficient of 0.053 (standard error = 0.012) and an R-squared of 0.135, after controlling
for origin-by-time and province fixed effects.
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics
Variable N>0 Zeros% Mean p25 p50 p75
ExportsMlnUS$ (X) 141091 29.8 27.86 0.09 0.95 8.82
Diasporas (D) 119729 40.4 260.58 3 14 74
Immigrant entrepreneurs (IE) 32889 83.6 8.49 1 2 5
DistKm (d) 200850 6068.71 2576.56 5125.04 8484.74
Note. ExportsMlnUS$ are exports in manufacturing in US$ millions, diaspora refers to
foreign residents, immigrant entrepreneurs refers to foreign-owned individual firms in
manufacturing, N>0 stands for the number of non-zero cells at province-country-year
level, and DistKm is distance in kilometers. All variables are in levels (estimation
period 2002-2011). Mean, p25, p50, p75 stand for the average, first quartile, second
quartile, and third quartile, respectively.
to this problem is to leverage a presumably exogenous source of variation in
immigrants’ locations using an IV strategy. When the independent variable
of interest is the stock of immigrants, this variation is generally provided by
immigrant enclaves. The idea is to use the past geographical distribution
of immigrants by ethnicity to apportion annual nationwide flows of immi-
grants to different regions. This was the instrument proposed by Altonji
and Card (1991) in their study of the effect of immigrants on natives’ labour
market outcomes, which has been widely used in trade-migration studies
(see, for instance, Peri and Requena-Silvente, 2010, Bratti et al., 2014).20
The underlying idea is that the presence in Italy of individuals from a given
foreign country may provide useful information about the host country to
new potential immigrants from the same country, reduce relocation costs,
and increase the potential benefits of migration. It must be noted, however,
that endogeneity concerns may be fewer in migration-trade studies than in
studies addressing the effects of immigrants in the host country’s labour mar-
ket, since it might be much easier for migrants to observe (or predict) the
20 Some recent studies exploit quasi-natural experiments provided by the (presumably)
random allocation of refugees across US states (Parsons and Ve´zina, 2014, Steingress,
2017). Even if considering specific episodes of migration generally allows for a convincing
identification, refugees are only a fraction of total immigrants, often very different from
economic immigrants (e.g. often they cannot work before their refugee status has been
recognized and have fewer contacts with natives), and their effect on trade may not be
easily generalizable to the latter.
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state of a province’s labour market, and to locate themselves in high-demand
markets, than to predict that a given province may provide the ideal environ-
ment to set up an exporting firm. Endogeneity concerns cannot, however, be
completely ruled out, and therefore we resort to an IV estimation strategy.
In more detail, we use the distribution of immigrants’ requests for resi-
dence permits21 (permessi di soggiorno) provided by the Ministry of Interior
in 1995 to apportion to provinces the flows of immigrants by ethnicity at the
nationwide level, obtaining a predicted stock of immigrants, which is used as
an instrument for the observed stock. Let us define Dijt as the diaspora (i.e.
the number of immigrants) from country j located in province i at time t,
and Djt the total stock of immigrants from country j at time t in Italy. Then
the proportion of total immigrants of nationality j residing in province i at
time t can be defined as:
whijt =
Dijt
Djt
. (6)
After defining Dj0 as the total stock of immigrants from country j in Italy in
the first year of the time interval (time zero, i.e. 2002), the predicted stock
of immigrants is:
D̂ijt = whij95Dj0 + whij95
t∑
q=0
Fjq = whij95(Dj0 +
t∑
q=0
Fjq) = whij95Djt (7)
where whij95 is the lagged distribution of immigrants by nationality across
provinces computed using residence permits, and Fjq is the total net inflow of
immigrants from country j to Italy at time q. The instrument is then given
by the product of two terms; the first (whij95) exhibits trading-pair variation,
and the second (Djt) country by time variation. The validity of this instru-
ment is generally argued stressing the lagged nature of the weights used
(whij95) and the aggregate nature of nationwide immigration flows, which
should ensure their orthogonality to province-country-year demand and sup-
ply shocks, which may also affect trade during the estimation period. From
equation (7) it is also clear that, when estimating a linear-in-logs specification
(i.e. double-log specification) of the gravity model, the enclave instrument is
not compatible with the inclusion of both trading pair (ij) and country-year
(jt) fixed effects, which would absorb the whole instrument’s variation.22
21 A residence permit, issued by the Italian Ministry of the Interior, is required for all
foreign nationals (non-EU citizens) who plan to stay more than 3 months in the country.
22 Indeed, ln(whij95Djt) = ln(whij95) + ln(Djt).
17
We use a similar idea to build an instrument for the stock of immigrant
entrepreneurs. In particular, we use the province-level distribution of immi-
grant entrepreneurs by country of origin in 2000 (the first year for which we
have data on immigrant entrepreneurs from Infocamere) and apportion the
time-varying nationwide stocks of firms by ethnicity to provinces according to
these weights. This instrument should be valid by the same arguments used
for the immigrant enclave instrument. As to relevance, there are three main
reasons why the predicted stock of immigrant entrepreneurs should correlate
well with the observed stock: (i) some of the firms operating in the year
the weights are computed will still be active during the estimation period;
(ii) production linkages between immigrant entrepreneurs may induce a co-
location of entrepreneurs, e.g. immigrant entrepreneurs may prefer suppliers
of the same nationality; (iii) co-location may also be induced by imitation
behavior, i.e. new immigrant entrepreneurs may set up firms after observing
that their co-nationals are running successful businesses.
A possible concern with the shift-share instrument is that it attributes a
zero value to all stocks of immigrants or immigrant entrepreneurs that were
not present in a province in the base year. Thus the instrument cannot af-
fect the stock of immigrants from those communities during the estimation
period. The issue becomes more severe the more the base year is lagged in
time. This is less of a problem where the effects are not heterogeneous by
either ethnicity or province of location, but it may affect the IV estimates if
the effects are heterogeneous along these dimensions. The compliers with the
instrument are indeed those trading pairs (country-province) whose stocks of
immigrants and immigrant entrepreneurs are moved by the enclave mecha-
nism. This cannot happen, for instance, for recently established communities,
i.e. communities that were not present in a given province in the base year.
For this reason, we check the robustness of our findings using an alterna-
tive instrument, which should be less sensitive to the issue just described.
Namely, we estimate gravity models for diaspora and the stock of immigrant
entrepreneurs using Poisson pseudo maximum likelihood (PPML):23
Dijt = exp(δit + θjt + γ1 ln(1 +Dij0 ∗Djt) + γ2 ln dij + γ3Borderij)vijt (8)
IEijt = exp(δit+θjt+φ1 ln(1+IEij0 ∗IEjt)+φ2 ln dij +φ3Borderij)uijt (9)
23 Ortega and Peri (2014) use a similar strategy to estimate the causal effect of migrants
and trade on income per capita.
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where the control variables have the same meaning as above. After estimat-
ing the two gravity equations, we compute the predicted values excluding
from the linear predictor demand pull factors, i.e. the province-year fixed
effects. Identification is based on one exclusion restriction for each equation
(namely ln(1 + Dij0 ∗ Djt) and ln(1 + IEij0 ∗ IEjt) for the immigrants and
immigrant entrepreneurs equations, respectively), and the same exogeneity
assumption as the shift-share instrument. However, one advantage of using
the two auxiliary regressions is that, while the value of the instrument is
zero, whenever Dij0 or IEij0 is zero for the shift-share instrument, the ad-
ditional regressors used in the PPML models can predict non-zero stocks of
immigrants and immigrant entrepreneurs even if a given ethnicity was not
present in a province in the base year. Of course this comes at a cost. Note
that, given that the auxiliary regressions include the same controls as the
second stages of two-stage least squares regression analysis (2SLS), for the
ethnicities that were not present in a province in the base year, identification
is based only on the non-linearity of PPML.24
As we mentioned, where there are heterogeneous effects the two instru-
ments may produce quite different results. If the pro-trade effect, for in-
stance, is higher for older communities of immigrants, i.e. those who es-
tablished themselves early in Italy, then the shift-share instrument, which
weights these communities more, may return higher IV estimates of the ef-
fect of immigrants than the PPML instrument.
6 Results
6.1 Dyadic effects
A first set of results, in which endogeneity is not addressed, is reported in
Table 3. Column (1) reports the specification commonly used in the gravity
equations augmented with the diaspora, which does not distinguish between
entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs. In what follows, we will often refer
to non-entrepreneur immigrants simply as ‘immigrants,’ or diaspora. The
ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates on the sample of observations with
positive exports return a coefficient of 0.115, which is in line with the findings
of the existing literature (see, for instance, Figure 1 in Bratti et al., 2014).
24 Even if the instruments are generated by a regression, 2SLS standard errors do not
need any further adjustment (Wooldridge, 2010).
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Column (2) reports the OLS results where the stocks of immigrants and
of immigrant entrepreneurs are entered separately in the regression. The
estimated elasticities of exports with respect to immigrants and immigrant
entrepreneurs are 0.096 and 0.086, respectively, in both cases statistically
significant at the 1% level. According to these results, the elasticity of exports
to immigrant entrepreneurs is similar in magnitude to that of exports to
non-entrepreneur immigrants. Estimating the log-log model only on non-
zero export observations may induce a bias in our estimates. Instead of
adding a constant to exports before taking the logarithm, and using the
log-log specification, in column (3) we use the PPML estimator proposed
by Silva and Tenreyro (2006).25 The estimated elasticities remain positive,
statistically significant at the 1% level, and of a similar order of magnitude:
0.069 for immigrants and 0.054 for immigrant entrepreneurs, respectively.
Despite the incidence of zeros in the sample (29.7% of export flows), PPML
results on positive observations (column 5) are almost indistinguishable from
those on the full sample.26 On the grounds of the similarity between the
estimates including and excluding zeros, and the convergence problems we
encountered estimating an IV-PPML model with a high number of fixed
effects, we use a log-log specification estimated on strictly positive export
observations as our preferred model for the remainder of the analysis.27
Back-of-the-envelope calculations from the estimates in column (2) indi-
cate that, for the median exporting province, a 1% increase in the population
of non-entrepreneur immigrants (D) would increase exports by roughly US$
652 (keeping immigrant entrepreneurs constant),28 whereas an inflow of 1%
immigrant entrepreneurs (IE) would increase exports by US$ 510 (keeping
25 The debate on the most appropriate non-linear estimator to be applied when zeros
are a relevant proportion of trade flows is still wide open. See De Benedictis and Taglioni
(2011), Baltagi et al. (2014) and Head and Mayer (2015) on this specific point of the
gravity literature. If the stock of immigrants and immigrant entrepreneurs are included
in the logarithm in the gravity equation estimated with PPML, their coefficients can be
interpreted as elasticities.
26 As noted in Silva and Tenreyro (2006), this suggests that the difference between OLS
and PPML may be driven by heteroscedasticity rather than truncation.
27 See Head and Mayer (2015) on that. In a recent paper, Aleksynska and Peri (2014)
proceed similarly, and after comparing PPML and linear estimates use the linear-in-logs
as their preferred econometric specification.
28 This figure is obtained by multiplying the median export flow (US$ 0.95 Million) by
the estimated elasticity (0.069) and dividing by 100. All the following back-of-the-envelope
computations are done in the same way.
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non-entrepreneur immigrants constant). On the other hand, keeping con-
stant the overall number of immigrants (D + IE), but allowing one migrant
to become an entrepreneur, would increase the median export flow by roughly
US$ 5769.29
Table 3: Baseline estimates, sample 2002-2011
OLS PPML
Dependent variable: ln(Xijt) > 0 Xijt ≥ 0 Xijt > 0
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ln(1+ Dijt+ IEijt) 0.115*** 0.091***
(0.009) (0.020)
ln(1+ Dijt) 0.096*** 0.069*** 0.069***
(0.009) (0.020) (0.019)
ln(1+ IEijt) 0.086*** 0.054*** 0.057***
(0.016) (0.020) (0.020)
ln(dij) -1.109*** -1.125*** -0.697*** -0.709*** -0.721***
(0.072) (0.072) (0.123) (0.127) (0.125)
Borderij 0.445** 0.386* -0.247** -0.216** 0.209*
(0.200) (0.200) (0.110) (0.108) (0.107)
Observations 141,091 141,091 200850 200850 141,091
R-squared 0.796 0.796 0.890 0.891 0.890
Fixed effects it; jt it; jt it; jt it; jt it; jt
Note. X are export flows. D refers to foreign residents while IE refers to foreign-owned
individual firms in manufacturing. In all regressions, standard errors in parentheses
are clustered at province-by-country and province-by-year level. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ statistically
significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. i, j, t are province, country and
time subscripts.
As we argued in the previous section, the OLS estimates may be subject
to an endogeneity bias, and we seek to tackle this issue by resorting to an
IV (2SLS) estimation strategy. Table 4 reports the first-stage results of the
2SLS estimates on positive-export observations using the shift-share instru-
29 Note that one migrant represents 7% of the median stock of (non-entrepreneur)
immigrants (14 immigrants) but 50% of the median stock of immigrant entrepreneurs (2
entrepreneurs). This effect is derived by multiplying the median export flow (US$ 0.95
Million) by the estimated elasticity (0.054) times the change in the stock of immigrant
entrepreneurs (0.118), minus the product of the median export flow (US$ 0.95 Million)
times the elasticity (0.069) times the change in the stock of immigrants (-0.004). Moreover,
US$ 5769 corresponds to an increase of 0.61% for the median export flow.
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Table 5: Second-stage 2SLS estimates, sample 2002-2011
2SLS
Dependent variable: ln(Xijt > 0)
(1) (2) (3)
ln(1 + Dijt+ IEijt) 0.172***
(0.017)
ln(1+ Dijt) 0.157*** 0.174***
(0.019) (0.017)
ln(1+ IEijt) 0.062** 0.059**
(0.024) (0.023)
ln(dij) -1.086*** -1.090*** -1.081***
(0.071) (0.073) (0.073)
Borderij 0.356* 0.300 0.272
(0.196) (0.197) (0.195)
Observations 141,091 141,091 141,091
Fixed effects it ; jt it ; jt it ; jt
IV
CardD+IE95 Card
D
95 PPML
D̂
CardIE00 PPML
ÎE
Note. X are export flows. D refers to foreign residents while IE refers to foreign-owned
individual firms. Standard errors in parentheses are double clustered at province-by-
country and province-by-year level. ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, ∗ statistically significant at the 1%, 5%
and 10% level, respectively. i, j, t are province, country and time subscripts.
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ment. As with the OLS estimates, we start with the specification pooling
all immigrants irrespective of their entrepreneur status. The first-stage co-
efficient is 0.5 and statistically significant at the 1% level. The F -statistic
shows no sign of a weak instrument problem. Columns (2) and (3) refer
to the specification including immigrants and immigrant entrepreneurs sep-
arately, showing the two first stages using the shift-share instrument. The
elasticity of the stock of immigrants to the predicted stock of immigrants
is 0.484 and to the predicted stock of immigrant entrepreneurs is 0.131, in
both cases statistically significant at the 1% level. Hence, immigrants tend
not only to follow compatriots’ past location choices, but also to settle where
there are more immigrant entrepreneurs, as presumably they find better em-
ployment opportunities. Similarly, the elasticities of the stock of immigrant
entrepreneurs to the predicted stock of immigrant entrepreneurs and the
predicted stock of immigrants are 0.671 and 0.047, respectively. There is,
therefore, evidence that immigrant entrepreneurs tend to set up firms where
there are larger communities from their country of origin, and where there
is already a larger presence of immigrant business created by co-nationals.
The joint F -statistics for the two instruments are very high, and again there
is no evidence of a weak instrument problem. Finally, columns (4) and (5)
show the first stages using the instruments built with the auxiliary grav-
ity PPML model for immigrants and immigrant entrepreneurs. Again, the
instruments are highly statistically significant, and the PPML instrument
seems to do a better job of separating the effects of immigrants and immi-
grant entrepreneurs in each first stage. Indeed, both the coefficient on the
predicted stock of immigrants in the immigrants equation and the coefficient
of the predicted stock of foreign entrepreneurs in the entrepreneurs equation
increase.
Table 5 reports the second-stage of 2SLS. Column (1), pooling immigrants
and immigrant entrepreneurs, shows a 0.17 elasticity of exports to diaspora,
almost 50% larger than that obtained with the OLS estimates. The increase
in the elasticity when using 2SLS seems to be at odds with an endogenous
location story, i.e. more immigrants and immigrant entrepreneurs locate
where there are more opportunities for international trade. By contrast, the
results may be consistent with a ‘negative selection’ story. That is immi-
grants may decide to become entrepreneurs especially in less competitive
provinces, which also tend to export less. Column (2) reports the second
stage of the specification, including diaspora and immigrant entrepreneurs
separately; their estimated elasticities are 0.157 and 0.062, respectively. Fi-
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nally, column (3) shows the second stage of the estimates using the instru-
ments based on the auxiliary PPML regressions,30 where the elasticity of
exports to immigrants is 0.174 and to immigrant entrepreneurs 0.059. Thus,
the two IV strategies give very similar results. Using the second strategy, for
instance, the estimated effect of a 1% increase in migrants is relatively higher
with respect to OLS estimation and corresponds to US$ 1644 for the median
export flows, whereas the estimated effect of a 1% increase in immigrant
entrepreneurs shrinks to US$ 557. The latter implies that the expected pro-
trade effect of a migrant becoming an entrepreneur (keeping D+IE constant)
amounts to US$ 5946 at the median export flow.
6.1.1 Robustness checks
A potential threat to our identification strategy may come from the omis-
sion of country-pair unobservables that are correlated with both exports and
immigrant entrepreneurs’ locations.31
Although we do not have any obvious omitted variable that can severely
bias our estimates in mind, as province-level unobservables acting on all
ethnicities (e.g. quality of province institutions) and country-level unobserv-
ables affecting all provinces (e.g. cultural proximity) are controlled for in our
regressions by province-year and country-year fixed effects, respectively, we
cannot completely discard the possibility of omitted-variable bias.
For this reason, in Table 6 we report some robustness checks that aim to
control for potential ij confounders. The idea is to cluster foreign countries
according to some similarity criteria, create bilateral fixed effects according
to these criteria (iJ), and include them in the 2SLS estimations. Column
(1) defines the cluster by quartiles of distance (in kilometers) and column
(2) by quartiles of language proximity (Melitz and Toubal, 2014).32 These
estimates are meant to capture confounders such as cultural proximity acting
at the trading-pair level, e.g. the level of trust that culturally proximate
immigrants enjoy in different provinces. Albeit with some slight changes in
the magnitude of the coefficients, the results are very robust in qualitative
30 The results of these regressions are reported in Table B1 in Appendix B.
31 As we have mentioned, the shift-share estimation strategy proposed by Altonji and
Card (1991) is incompatible with including country-pair fixed effects and country-year
fixed effects in gravity models, which absorb the whole instrument’s variability.
32 In particular, we use the unadjusted proximity index based on language trees, but
the results are robust to the use of alternative indexes.
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terms. Both the diaspora and the population of immigrant entrepreneurs
have significant positive effects on exports, with elasticities in the ranges of
0.179-0.185 and 0.051-0.062, respectively.
Another example of omitted variables potentially biasing our estimates
is the stock of Italian emigrants living in immigrants’ countries of origin.
Indeed, the trade-generating effect may originate from the Italian diaspora
providing potential immigrants in the home country with useful information
on suitable locations in Italy to live in or to set up businesses (Bastos and
Silva, 2012, Lodefalk, 2016), and at the same time helping Italian firms to
overcome informational barriers related to export activities. We check the
robustness to this potential threat by excluding from the estimation sample
the top destinations of Italian emigrants (accounting for up to 75% of Italian
emigrant stock)33 and the results are presented in column (3). The esti-
mates are robust, and the coefficients both on immigrants and on immigrant
entrepreneurs remain virtually unchanged.
In column (4), we check the sensitivity of our estimates to excluding
China from the estimation sample, which accounts for a large proportion of
both the total population of immigrants and, in particular, entrepreneurs.
The coefficient on immigrant entrepreneurs becomes larger, reaching 0.064
compared with 0.059 in the baseline estimates (column (3) of Table 5). Thus,
we conclude that our results are not driven by trade with China.
Finally, in column (5) we check the robustness of our results to allow
for cross-sectional dependence in the error terms and cluster standard er-
rors at the province-by-country and area-by-year level (four macro-areas are
considered: North-East, North-West, Centre, South). Allowing for spatial
dependence at the Italian macro-area level has virtually no effect on the
coefficients’ statistical significance.
6.2 Aggregate province-level effects
We conclude our analysis by attempting to throw light on other potential
effects of diasporas and immigrant entrepreneurs, which could affect export
of province i towards all destinations, i.e. the effects running through labour
costs and average firm productivity (wit and φ¯it, respectively) described in
Section 3. We attempt this by regressing the province-year fixed effects
33 The year or reference is 2012 but countries of destination have been fairly stable in
the last sixty years; data source: the Registry of Italians Resident Abroad (AIRE).
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estimated using 2SLS (δ̂it) on the populations of immigrants and immigrant
entrepreneurs, immigrant diversity, and some additional controls. Namely,
we estimate the following equation:
δ̂it =β1 ln(Di,t) + β2 ln(IEi,t) + β3 ln(TFPi2002) + β4 ln(MNEi2002) (10)
+ β5 ln(DIV
N
i2002) + Cityi2002 + γt + εi,t
where i is the subscript for Italian provinces (NUTS-3) and t stands for time.
Di,t and IEi,t are the total stocks of immigrants and immigrant entrepreneurs
located in province i at time t, respectively. In the light of the fact that the
dependent variable is nothing more than the ‘outward’ multilateral resistance
term and captures the relative ‘competitiveness’ of exports from province i,
we add some additional controls at the beginning of the period, which ac-
count for different initial competitiveness levels of Italian provinces. Namely,
we include total factor productivity (TFP) of manufacturing firms,34 the
proportion of foreign multinational enterprises (MNEs),35 a measure of the
diversity of the local labour force (DIV),36 and a dummy variable equal to
one for provinces with above-median populations (City).37 All these con-
trol variables are evaluated in the first available year, i.e. 2002, to make
them predetermined with respect to the estimation period.38 Accordingly,
we limit the estimation to the period 2003-2011. Finally, γt is a year fixed
effect, whereas ijt is an error term clustered at the province level to account
for serial correlation in trade. Since the fixed effects that represent our de-
pendent variables have been estimated from a regression, observations are
weighted by the inverse of the standard errors of the δ̂its.
39
Results are reported in Table 7. The weighted least square (WLS) esti-
mates in columns (1)-(5) show that the positive association between immi-
grants and the dependent variable, which we consider a proxy of provinces’
overall competitiveness, is reduced in size and loses statistical significance
when the controls are progressively included in the regression. A big drop
34 TFP is estimated using Wooldridge (2009) GMM approach on firm-level balance
sheets from AIDA (Bureau van Dijk).
35 This measures the number of MNEs in a given province i. Source: ICE-Reprint.
36 Computed as the inverse of the Herfindahl-Hirschman index on total residents of a
given province (including natives).
37 Changing the population threshold does not affect the main results.
38 Since diaspora and immigrant entrepreneurs during the estimation period may affect
them.
39 Results are fully robust to the use of FGLS; see Table B2 in Appendix.
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in the coefficient is caused by the inclusion of the stock of MNEs and the
population diversity index, both of which are positively associated with com-
petitiveness. In contrast, the coefficient on immigrant entrepreneurs is very
stable across all specifications, and varies in the range of 0.237-0.313. In
the last column, we present the 2SLS estimates using the shift-share instru-
ment.40 Again, the effect of immigrant entrepreneurs on province compet-
itiveness is positive and significant, with an estimated elasticity of 0.237,
while the elasticity to immigrants is positive but statistically insignificant.
All in all, the results in this section point to a non-negligible positive effect
of the population of immigrant entrepreneurs on a province’s capacity to ex-
port towards all destinations, which adds to the dyadic effects estimated in
Section 6.1.
7 Concluding remarks
When establishing themselves in a region, immigrants bring knowledge about
their countries of origin and retain long-lasting relationships with their co-
nationals who are left behind. Such knowledge and contacts may partly spill
over to native entrepreneurs and help them to export their products abroad.
Indeed, immigrants help natives to overcome the informational barriers that
make it costly to enter foreign markets, or they may substitute poor market
institutions, for instance by helping with contract enforcement. A number
of studies have already reported evidence consistent with this hypothesis by
demonstrating a positive causal effect of immigrants on exports.
The current paper adds to this evidence by investigating the trade-creating
effect of immigrant entrepreneurs. After outlining various reasons why im-
migrant entrepreneurs can spur export activities in the regions in which they
settle, primarily the fact that they can directly exploit their superior knowl-
edge of the country of origin by setting up a business, we test this hypothesis
using data from Italy.
Using a 10-year panel dataset on Italian provinces (i.e. NUTS-3 regions),
and gathering administrative data on exports, the diaspora, and the popu-
lation of entrepreneurs by country of origin, we estimate augmented gravity
models for exports. The potential endogeneity of both immigrants and im-
40 Indeed, the PPML instrument cannot be used when the predicted values are aggre-
gated at the same level of the multilateral-resistance terms, since the fitted values will be
equal to those observed (Fally, 2015).
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migrant entrepreneurs is addressed using an instrumental variables estimator
based on a shift-share instrument a` la Altonji and Card (1991). As is well
known, this instrument exploits the immigrant enclaves that were present in
domestic regions in a base year and apportion to regions the annual nation-
wide waves of immigrants (shift) according the relative weight of the enclaves
(share). To overcome some potential weaknesses of such an instrument, which
does not use for identification new immigrant or entrepreneur nationalities
that were not present in the host country in the base year, we also use a
second instrumental variable based on auxiliary PPML gravity models for
non-entrepreneur migrants and immigrant entrepreneurs, which overcomes
this limitation. The IV estimates obtained with both strategies give very
similar results, and they point to large causal effects of both immigrants and
immigrant entrepreneurs on exports. Using the second IV strategy (based
on PPML models), the estimated effect of a 1% increase in the population
of non-entrepreneur immigrants corresponds to a US$ 1644 rise in yearly
manufacturing exports for the host province towards the immigrants’ coun-
try of origin at the median export flows, whereas the estimated effect of a
1% increase in the population of immigrant entrepreneurs on yearly province
exports in manufacturing is US$ 557. According to these estimates, trans-
forming a (non-entrepreneur) migrant into an entrepreneur would raise yearly
province exports in manufacturing by US$ 5946 at the median export flow.
Our results are robust to a number of sensitivity checks, addressing poten-
tial confounding factors that may bias our estimates, such as communities
of Italian emigrants living abroad or the fact that the whole effect may be
driven by larger and more entrepreneurial immigrant communities (e.g. the
Chinese communities).
Finally, we propose that diasporas and immigrant entrepreneurs may im-
pact positively on province-level exports not only via the dyadic effects pos-
tulated by the business and social network mechanism but also by increasing
a province’s overall competitiveness, which raises its exports towards all pos-
sible destinations. We investigate this hypothesis by regressing the province-
year fixed effects estimated in the export gravity equations on the diaspora,
entrepreneurs, and a set of control variables. We find that increasing the
population of immigrant entrepreneurs by 10% increases competitiveness (i.e.
the province-year fixed effect of the gravity model) by 2.4%.
Although the regional nature of our data does not enable us to ultimately
say whether the observed effects are of a private nature only, i.e. if they
are fully accounted for by the superior export performance of immigrant
31
entrepreneurs, or are partly of a public nature, also capturing spillover effects
on native firms — a question that could only be answered using firm-level
data — our paper is, to the best of our knowledge, the first to document
rigorously a positive causal effect of the presence of immigrant entrepreneurs
on regions’ export performance.
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A Appendix: ISO 3 country codes’ descrip-
tion
Table A1: ISO 3 country codes and country names
ISO 3 code Country name
CHN China
ROU Romania
CHE Switzerland
MAR Morocco
DEU Germany
ALB Albania
TUN Tunisia
FRA France
ARG Argentina
SRB Serbia
EGY Egypt
SEN Senegal
BGD Bangladesh
PAK Pakistan
VEN Venezuela
BRA Brazil
BEL Belgium
GBR United Kingdom
NGA Nigeria
UKR Ukraine
Note. Codes refer to the countries listed in Table 1 in the main text.
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B Appendix: Additional Tables
Table B1: PPML IV auxiliary regression, estimation sample 2002-2011
Dependent variable: Dijt IEijt
(1) (2)
ln(dij) 0.165* 0.600***
(0.100) (0.077)
Borderij 0.431** 0.703***
(0.180) (0.171)
ln(1 + CardD95) 0.694***
(0.025)
ln(1 + CardIE00 ) 0.890***
(0.021)
Observations 200850 200850
R-squared 0.81 0.97
FEs it ; ij it ; jt
Note. D refers to foreign residents while IE refers to foreign owned individual firms.
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at province-by-country. ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, ∗ sta-
tistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. i, j, t are province,
country and time subscripts.
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